Behavioral foundations for open innovation: Knowledge gifts and social networks by Wilfred Dolfsma (1383795) & Rene Van der Eijk (7185221)
 Behavioral Foundations for Open Innovation:  
Knowledge Gifts and Social Networks 
 
 
The innovation process has come to be seen as an interactive process where knowledge is 
continuously exchanged between individuals and actors internal and also external to a firm (Autio 
et al. 2004; Huizingh 2011; Landry et al. 2002). Innovation is, primarily, cooperative undertakings 
(Wuchty et al. 2007). Open Innovation (OI) plays an important role in innovation and will become 
increasingly important in the years to come (Chesbrough 2003a, b; Huizingh 2011).  Open 
innovation involves knowledge being shared or exchanged with no or only limited contractual 
arrangements and no formal command and control relation between parties involved.1 In the 
generally accepted definition of OI (“‘the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation, and to expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively’” Huizingh 2011, p.2) a defining feature of OI is that sharing knowledge occurs 
across firm boundaries (cf. Dahlander & Gann 2012). Cooperation may be with other firms, some 
of its employees, or with customers (Bogers et al. 2010). This definition suggests that the flow of 
knowledge is the result of purposive behaviors by employees, following instructions of 
management, in effect seeing their behaviors being lined up with firm strategy. Individual 
employees involved in innovation activities, however, are in part and necessarily acting 
discretionary (Aalbers et al. 2014), and can as well show purposive OI behaviors that is not in line 
with firm strategy and perhaps in direct conflict with it (Ferrary 2003). 
                                                 
1 In this paper we will use the terms knowledge exchange, knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing 
interchangeably. 
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The behavioral dimensions of people sharing knowledge under such circumstances, 
especially across firm boundaries, are largely ignored: why would individuals share knowledge 
without a formal, contractual guarantee of some return? This conceptual paper argues that there is a 
need for a clearer understanding of the behavioral and motivational issues involved in knowledge 
sharing with a view to innovation, and offers suggestions to address this lacuna. Literature in 
psychology and on corporate citizenship indicates that motivational and behavioral issues can 
matter crucially if one is to understand success or failure of a (temporary) organizational form 
(Aalbers et al. 2013; Foss & Lindenberg 2011; Organ 1990; Molm 2003), particularly when 
activities are extra-contractual and thus discretionary. Innovation activities, including OI activities, 
are at least in part discretionary, and thus not the direct result of formal instructions as part of 
someone’s functionally defined role in an organization, provided by management.  Some behaviors 
that ostensibly are to be characterized as open innovation behaviors, involving purposive 
knowledge transfer crossing firm boundaries, can, however, even be at odds with what somebody in 
a functional role is explicitly allowed to do (Ferrary 2003). The contribution this paper offers thus 
complements the more strategic issues in this discussion about open innovation (cf. Chesbrough 
2003a, b; Henkel 2006). 
Social exchange (of knowledge) does not necessarily happen by itself (Szulanski 1996), 
and may certainly have negative consequences as well (Gibney et al. 2009). A shifting ‘locus of 
innovation’ (von Hippel 2003b, p.39) will not leave the interactions between persons unaffected: 
how can the interactions they have within and across firm boundaries be understood? In particular, 
from a behavioral point of view: What explains why people are involved in the largely extra-role 
and not-contracted-for behavior of sharing knowledge? Social network analysis (SNA) offers 
insights into knowledge transfer as it explores network structure and network position (Allen, 1977; 
Allen and Cohen, 1969; Burt, 1992, 2004; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966; Gabbay and 
Zuckerman, 1998; Galunic and Moran, 2000; Hansen, 1999; Landry et al., 2002; Nahaphiet and 
Ghosal, 1998; Tushman, 1978; Tushman and Scalan, 1981). Social networks capture the important 
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structural aspect of the cooperation involved in knowledge exchange. Social Network Analysis, 
however, purposefully ignores the motivational or behavioral dimension (see Aalbers et al. 2013; 
Obstfeld 2005). This behavioral dimension may be important for knowledge transfer too, however 
(Bouty 2000; Flyn 2003). The OI literature has a similar lack of attention to the behavioral or 
motivational aspects of individual knowledge transfer. We seek to suggest a way of combining 
insights from social network analysis with those from social exchange theory to address this 
shortcoming. 
Several unanswered questions thus remain, but we focus on one: What micro processes are 
involved in sharing knowledge, particularly when knowledge sharing crosses firm boundaries (Darr 
et al. 1995; Felin & Foss 2005; Henkel 2006; Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Tsai, 2001; von Hippel 
1987; Obstfeld, 2005)? The “action problem” Obstfeld (2005) identified must be addressed: when, 
how and how much will people actually share knowledge, using the network structure that is there? 
 
This article proceeds as follows. We first discuss aspects of knowledge relevant knowledge 
exchange. Social network literature is discussed to determine the extent to which it can be used to 
help explain knowledge sharing with reference to those characteristics of knowledge. Section 3 
examines the ‘action problem’ that social network literature is rightfully claimed to have, which 
Section 4 addresses by introducing and developing the complementary notion of gift exchange. 
Section 5 then critically discusses literature on knowledge exchange by scientists in R&D 
laboratories from this perspective, highlighting the added insight the combination of social network 
analysis and social (gift) exchange theory offers. Before we conclude (Section 7), Section 6 
highlights some challenges for managers the argument in our paper suggests. 
 
1.  Knowledge characteristics 
Schumpeter (1934) has famously claimed that innovation emerges from re-combining existing 
knowledge, in other words from sharing it among individuals. Burt (2004) has argued that new 
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knowledge will develop from knowledge exchange, and is particularly likely to emerge at 
intersections where structural holes connect otherwise disconnected communities. Cooperation 
involving a number of interdependent actors who are able to specialize to a certain degree is in part 
what organizations are there for (Lopes & Castro Caldas 2015). What people are involved in needs 
to be coordinated, and details of the content of the work must be shared for organizational benefits 
to become available. Knowledge exchange may be less obvious then the exchange of more tangible 
resources (Szulanski 1996). The exchange of innovative knowledge is different from that of other 
goods for a number of reasons that we will elaborate upon below, however (cf. von Krogh 1998). 
Importantly, the exchange of knowledge for innovation tends to be extra-role behavior in many 
cases (Organ 1990), and so not straightforwardly mandated by management or specified in a 
contract and thus open to discretion by the individual. We identify four characteristics of new 
knowledge or knowledge relevant for innovations which in particular affect the way in which it is 
transferred, and especially in the context of OI (cf. Von Krogh 1998).  
 
 Developing new knowledge is, first of all, fraught with uncertainty (rather than mere risk), 
even when development of new technological knowledge is path-dependent. Uncertainty of a 
technological nature is well documented, but uncertainty of a strategic nature is involved as well. 
How much investment is needed, for how long? What market will there be for the products that 
may ultimately be designed based on new knowledge? Which competitors will be faced?  
Knowledge easily spills over unintentionally, and is in general a commodity the use and 
development of which is affected by opportunistic behavior of other parties, increasing associated 
transactions costs (Jones et al. 1997). If only characteristics and value of the knowledge yet to be 
developed is impossible to determine beforehand, contracting for the complete set of future 
scenarios that may ensue where the knowledge to be developed is involved in cannot be undertaken 
(Field, 2003; Hodgson 2005; Inkpen 1996; Starpoli 1998).  
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 The process of knowledge generation and the resulting technological advance for the most 
part is, secondly,  a cumulative process, where scientists draw on the work done by others, possibly 
in the past, and is generally based on the efforts of many inventors and developers (Mokyr 2002; 
Scotchmer 1991; Dolfsma & Seo 2013). Knowledge generation requires that individuals have 
related knowledge; acquiring new knowledge at least initially involves tacit dimensions and may 
require coding and decoding (Dolfsma 2008a; Polanyi 1966). While newly developed knowledge is 
likely to be of a tacit nature, knowledge that developed in the past is more likely to be explicit. New 
knowledge needs integration into an existing larger framework of knowledge of the individual in 
which meaning is given to new piece of information. Actors find it easier to adopt and interpret 
knowledge that is “related” to their knowledge base (Hansen, 2002; Markides and Williamson, 
1994). Accumulated stocks of knowledge are essential to the innovation development process, first 
as a resource to directly develop innovations, and, secondly as a basis for absorbing new knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Hansen, 2002; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Obstfeld, 2005; 
Powell et al. 1996). The literature on technological paradigms has argued that what holds for 
individuals also applies to groups of individuals, for instance involved in the development of a 
technological field (Dosi 1982; Mokyr 2002). Knowledge then, in the words of Isaac Newton, is 
developed while standing on the shoulders of giants (cf. Merton 1965).  
 New knowledge is created in communities of practice, while the individuals interacting 
may or may not be members of the same organization (Bouty 2000; Brown and Duguid 1991, 2001; 
Nonaka 1994; Wenger & Snyder 2000). Individuals in communities of practice may interact on a 
regular basis to solve problems, establishing mutual trust in the process (Knight 1967; Van der Eijk 
et al. 2009), building relationships of trust due to their affiliation and the engagement in common 
practices while sharing similar interests and/or expertise (Brown & Duguid 1991; 2001; Wenger & 
Snyder 2000; Wenger 1998). Communities of practice are repositories of social capital, with 
members trusting each other, facilitating exchange; they enable quick identification of and 
connection between individuals who have relevant knowledge. Communities of practice thus are 
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“significant repositories for the development, maintenance, and reproduction of knowledge” 
(Brown & Duguid 2001; cf. Lesser 2000), allowing individual members to solve problems and 
transfer best practices (Wenger 1998). Although co-location may be important for knowledge 
spillovers to occur (Dar et al. 1995; Decarolis & Deeds 1999). Communities of practices can also 
span geographical distances (Agrawal et al. 2003; Brown & Duguid 2001; Ensign 2009). 
Communities of practice tend to be associated with informal contacts between individuals (Dar et 
al. 1995; Furukawa & Goto 2006; Park 2002).  
 Knowledge is, fourth and finally, a (quasi) public good. It is non-exclusive: consumption or 
use by non-payers cannot be excluded without such means as intellectual property rights. 
Knowledge is also non-rivalrous: it is not consumed by its use (Alder 2001; Arrow 1984). 
“Information [thus] is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce” (Shapiro & Varian 1999, p.21). 
This has strategic implications for firms, but for individuals within firms as well. As imitation or 
communication of knowledge can be easy and cheap, there is a tendency for these goods to be 
under-produced (Romer 2002). Information and knowledge are faced with an information paradox 
(Adler 2001; Arrow 1971): prior to the acquisition of information the value to the buyer cannot be 
established. If the potential buyer is allowed to inspect the good as a whole so as to determine its 
value to her, there no longer is a need for her to actually obtain it. As the product cannot be 
repossessed after the inspection, the seller may not be able to sell the good unless additional 
institutional arrangements such as Intellectual Property Rights are in place to provide exclusivity. 
Providing a sample of the good may mitigate the paradox, but only if the provider can be trusted to 
indicate exactly how representative the sample will be of the complete product. There will be a 
tendency for the provider to adversely select what to show the buyer. From an economics point of 
view, markets for knowledge fail inherently (Stiglitz 1994).  
 
As a consequence of the characteristics of knowledge, its exchange  between people is by no means 
an easy or self-evident process (Hansen 1999; Szulanski 1996), and likely to be extra-role for 
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individuals involved due in large part  to the characteristics of what is exchanged. For these reasons 
a number of scholars suggest that a more informal mode of governance for exchange and 
coordination, different from that of market or hierarchy, may best suit exchange of knowledge 
(Bradach & Eccles 1989; Dore 1983; Hemetsberger & Reinhardt 2009; Ouchi, 1980; Powell 1990). 
Table 1 presents a summary of this position – rather than discussing the characteristics of this 
informal, social exchange in general, we will focus on what form such exchange actually takes, and 
how it would functions in the context of knowledge exchange. This brings us to a discussion of the 
behavioral and motivational aspects of knowledge exchange, left largely unspecified in the 
literature so far. It is here that this paper contributes. 
 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
 
Coordination mechanisms need not mutually exclude one another (Dolfsma et al. 2005), but 
innovative knowledge transfer is subject in large part to the third coordination mechanism. Even 
when trust and informal contacts thrive here, social relations importantly do have a structural aspect 
to them that literature in the Social Network analysis domain has explored. 
 
2. Social Network Literature 
A network is a set of relations linking nodes (e.g., people or organizations) (Knoke & Kuklinski 
1982; Scott, 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Social network theory focuses on the position of 
nodes in the structure. Actors’ behavior, it is assumed, is determined by the structure of the social 
network in which they are embedded. The position of actors in a network and type and number of 
ties determines the actors’ performance outcomes as well (Burt 1992; Hansen 1999). Social 
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Network Analysis is increasingly recognized as a powerful perspective for studying innovation 
(Kastelle & Steen 2010a ; Dolfsma & Leenders 2016).2 
 Social network literature holds that while knowledge may reside in individuals, it is 
through networks that knowledge is exchanged and can be both put to use as well as developed 
further (Allen 1977; Coleman et al. 1966; Tushman 1978; Tushman & Scanlan 1981). Network 
configurations and positions in the social network facilitate dissemination of information, and thus 
innovation. In line with what the literature on communities of practice suggests, social network 
theory indicates that, for instance, the shape of the network (its density, redundancy, clustering, 
size) (Allen and Cohen 1969; Tsai 2001) or the position of individuals (centrality, tie strength) 
(Hansen 1999; Granovetter 1973; 1982; Reagans & McEvily 2003; Uzzi 1997) represent an 
important explanans for knowledge sharing and creation. In case of a low redundancy level, for 
instance, if more weak ties constitute the network, this stimulates a search for new ideas possibly 
from a more diverse set of sources. There may also be loosely related subgroups in a network of 
relatively many weak ties (cf. Granovetter 1973). Subgroups may be connected by structural holes 
that can exert great influence on the exchange (e.g. Burt 1992; 2004). “Closed” or cohesive 
networks, where redundancy is high, cannot easily be controlled by outsiders but are also less likely 
to have access to novel ideas, information and knowledge as the inflow of new ideas into a closed 
network is more limited than in a non-redundant network (Granovetter 1973). Such a network 
structure, usually marked by frequent communication and strong ties, does, however, offer actors 
the benefits of cooperative, coordinated action (Granovetter 1985; Obstfeld 2005) and the ability 
and willingness to exchange complex knowledge as a shared frame of reference and trust may more 
easily develop (Coleman 1988; Hansen 1999; Reagans and McEvily 2003; Uzzi 1997; Walker et al. 
1997). Transfer of tacit knowledge, especially if of a sensitive nature, may require such close, 
personal interaction of individuals (Aalbers et al. 2016; Bouty 2000; Hansen 1999; Kogut and 
                                                 
2 Note that in this paper we talk about relations between individuals only. In network analysis, nodes can also 
be different kinds of entities, such as events, artefacts, or locations, and a relation or tie between nodes need 
not signify knowledge transfer (Van der Valk &Gijsbers; Aalbers & Dolfsma 2015).. 
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Zander 1992; Nonaka 1994; Polanyi 1966). Given the different strengths and weaknesses of the 
different network structures it is not surprising that research has taken a contingency approach 
emphasizing that different network structures are beneficial in different circumstances (e.g. Ahuja 
2000; Podolny 2001; Rowley et al. 2000). 
A network structure provides possibilities for actors to exchange with some actors and not 
with others (Skvoretz & Lovaglia 1995). The structure of a network, in this view, determines with 
whom such extra-role behavior, ‘above and beyond’ what may be required of people, can be 
expected (Kastelle & Steen 2010b; Zagenczyk et al. 2008), with some structures being better at 
promoting some kinds of activities over other activities (Ohly et al. 2010). Under-emphasizing the 
role of agency, social network literature suggests implicitly that the exchange of knowledge 
depends (only) on the ‘pipes and prisms’ of the network (Owen-Smith & Powell 2004; Podolny 
2001; Tsai & Ghosal 1998). Acknowledging a role for strategic uncertainty due to agents’ behavior 
is problematic within the SNA framework (Foss et al. 2010). Opportunistic behavior on the part of 
actors in a network, as a result of which knowledge may not be freely shared, is inexplicable for 
SNA. Even in an otherwise trusting community (of practice), some individuals may be inclined to 
show behavior that undermines trust. Social network theory, focusing on the structure of relations 
only, cannot explain why relations emerge, change in nature, or end (see Van der Eijk et al. 2009). 
What may be claimed at most is that there is a tendency for certain kinds of behavior to be present 
in networks of a certain configuration. In closed, dense network, for instance, where all the nodes 
are mutually connected, the risk of opportunistic behavior may be lower due to emergence of 
enforceable norms (Coleman 1988; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993) reputation effects (Coleman 
1988; Ferrary 2003; Kreps 1990; Ostrom & Ahn 2003; Sherry 1983) and repeat-interaction effect 
(Abreu 1998, Fudenberg & Maskin 1986; Kreps et al. 1982). Actors properly connected, it is then 
assumed, will not be excluded from knowledge sharing; there will be no rivalry in knowledge 
sharing.  
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From an SNA point of view, knowledge as a public good may be under-produced only if a network 
is not properly configured. How network structures emerge or evolve is not much addressed in 
SNA, however (Ahuja et al. 2012). Since SNA does not discuss the content of what is transferred 
using the networks, it cannot address the cumulative nature and inherent uncertainty of knowledge 
development. The difficulties of the diffusion and further development of knowledge reach beyond 
the structural elements of networks. However, while SNA theory has recognized the information 
and resource benefits of specifics of network structures, it has not focused on motivational or 
behavioral issues (cf. Hansen 1999; Moran & Ghosal 1996; Van der Eijk et al. 2009). A more 
thorough understanding of the micro processes and behavioral foundations of socially sharing 
knowledge is needed (Darr et al. , 1995; Kim & Mauborgne 1998; Obstfeld, 2005; Tsai 2001; see 
especially Felin & Foss 2005 and Foss et al. 2010). Why actors share knowledge, or how relations 
get started, can be mobilized and coordinated, has received little attention (Van der Eijk et al. 
2009). Obstfeld (2005) has, thus, claimed rightfully that SNA has an ‘action problem’.  
 
3. Action Problem 
Whenever individuals can achieve a common goal through cooperation, but each have other goals 
as well that are not (fully) aligned with the shared goal, a potential problem of (collective) action 
exists (Olson 1965, see also Randel & Ranft 2007). As Huysman & de Wit (2004) point out, due to 
the kind of good knowledge is, “knowledge sharing cannot be forced; people will only share 
knowledge if there is a personal reason to do so” (cf. Brown & Duguid 1991; 2001; Szulanski 1996; 
Wenger & Snyder 2000; Wenger 1998). Why do individuals, in the absence of clearly defined, 
formal, enforceable obligations, feel compelled to (continue to) provide others with knowledge? To 
achieve a mutually beneficial form of cooperation partially overlapping goals need to be aligned, 
addressing the motivational or behavioral dimensions of individuals’ involvement in joint activities. 
When needs, interests or interpretations do not align and no way is found to address that, joint 
activities may not develop whatever structural connections are in place. This is what Obstfeld 
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(2005) has dubbed the action problem for social network theory. The action problem may even be 
more pertinent in an OI setting where formal means to ensure knowledge exchange are absent to 
even indirectly have an effect (cf. Aalbers et al. 2014). Coordination through social relations is 
inevitable, but cannot be formally enforced, given what is exchanged in the context of OI relations. 
Referring to Figure 1, either a specific Alter (1A) or others one is more indirectly related to (Alter-
II; 1B) may but need not act in the expected manner since individual motivations or interpretations 
may prevent them from doing so (Uehera 1990). Interaction of the generalized type, (1C), may be 
least conducive to joint activity if interests do not align since not even an indirect structural 
connection exists between Ego and Y who reciprocates. In such a situation Ego may nonetheless 
initiate exchange in hopes of reciprocation and inclusion into a community (Ferrary 2003; Van der 
Eijk et al. 2009). In each of the three cases, reciprocation is not inevitable, however, even when a 
direct relation exists (Ekeh 1974; Ferrary 2003). As a result of the foregoing discussion, in case of 
Figure 1A, market, hierarchy as well as social relations type of coordination can be expected to 
work. In a situation that Figure 1B represents, however market coordination is not (less) likely to be 
effective. At the very least, market coordination of the classical kind using bilateral contracts no 
longer work unequivocally – other mechanism must be relied on (more).  Other governance 
mechanisms can be those that are available in a hierarchy, or those that can be employed in social 
exchange situations.  The situation portrayed in Figure 1C will require a variety of social interaction 
governance mechanisms to work. 
Since SNA has focused exclusively on structural elements, it cannot assume what it in fact 
does assume: that the social capital and trust that may inhere in a network can be drawn on at will 
(cf. Coleman 1988, Van der Eijk et al. 2009).  Due to socialization (Bauer et al. 2007), the 
alignment between group and individual motives may be larger between two individuals in a single 
organization when compared with individuals in different organizations. Since open innovation can 
and often does involve interactions between individuals from different organizations, the 
motivational challenges may be compounded. Coordinating intra- and inter-organizational 
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collaboration, despite possibly conflicting goals and the possibility of opportunistic behavior, in the 
absence of coordination or regulation by external authority, does occur however (Ahuja 2000; 
Bouty 2000; Gulati & Singh 1998). Informal routines are typically established to accomplish this. 
Understanding how these develop and are used provides behavioral or motivational micro 
foundations for knowledge sharing, particularly in an OI setting.  
 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
 
4. Gift / Favor exchange  
For innovation it is clear that the flow of knowledge between agents within the same and across the 
boundaries of organizations is required. The flow of knowledge even within a single organization is 
far from obvious, however (Cross et al. 2001; Ghosal & Barlett 1988; Hansen 1999; Kogut & 
Zander 1992; Szulanski 1996). Knowledge may be present with actors in a network but not 
transferred for a number of reasons. Actors may not want to exchange knowledge, or may simply 
not know about the need that others have for their knowledge. The notion of sharing, 
conceptualized in the literature on gift exchange, provides an explanation of how actors are able to 
solicit the cooperation and exchange of knowledge from people within their network as well as 
from people beyond it (Bouty 2000; Dolfsma 2008b; Flynn 2003; Van der Eijk et al. 2009; Zeitlyn 
2003). In the context of the extra-role behavior of knowledge transfer this argument has not been 
comprehensively made, nor were conceptual foundations developed.  
Gift exchange theory offers insight into a wide variety of contexts (e.g. Akerlof 1982; Blau 
1964; Heath 1976; Homans 1974). Gift exchange is sometimes, erroneously associated with the 
giving and receiving of  explicit gifts on occasions such as birthdays, anniversaries, holidays and 
other special personal moments motivated by altruistic considerations only, but in actual fact is 
more encompassing. However significant in economic terms (Economist 2006), gift exchange is not 
limited to gifts in that sense. Informal relations of give & take are pivotal in cooperation between 
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firms (Uzzi 1997), even in markets where homogenous products are exchanged (Smart 1993), as 
well as within a firm (e.g. Ensign 2009).  
Marcel Mauss (1954) and other anthropologists and ethnographers have made the point that 
the obligation to give, receive and reciprocate is universal, yet the way in which to give and what to 
give is context-dependent (Cheal 1986; Ekeh 1976; Sahlins 1996; Simmel 1996; Smart 1993). In a 
social, cultural context, institutions determine also when a gift is to be reciprocated (Van der Eijk et 
al. 2009). To the extent that gift exchange literature undergirds OI, one would expect inbound OI 
not to persist without outbound OI: in actual fact, over time, the two would be connected 
inseparably, even if conceptually distinct for some analytical purposes (Dahlander & Gann 2012). 
A mixture of motives is involved in gift exchange, including altruism, power and self-
interest (Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Malinowski 1996; Mauss 1954). Smart (1993) points out that the 
exchange partners can but need not be aware of the instrumental goals involved. Both the possibly 
instrumental goals involved as well as the perceived value of a gift must ostensibly be ignored by 
the parties involved (Beltramini 1996; Bourdieu 1992). This is an important reason for favor or gift 
exchange to be ritualized (Khalil 2004). If actors fall short of expectations about giving and 
reciprocating, the particular dyadic exchange relationship may be terminated and excommunication 
from the wider social network may follow (Mauss 1954; Van der Eijk et al. 2009): “individual 
aggressiveness is curbed by the prospect of ostracism among peers, in both trade and social 
circumstances” (Williamson 1975, p.107). Mauss (1954) has argued in this context that people are 
required to (1) give, (2) receive, as well as (3) reciprocate (Dore 1983; Gouldner 1960; Levi-Strauss 
1996; Malinowski 1996; Sahlins 1996; Schwartz 1996; Simmel 1996), at least with peers (Ferrary 
2003). Not being involved in gift exchange means one is not (yet) seen as a worthy peer, or one has 
violated context specific routines or rituals of exchange.  
Most resources can be gifts, as gifts may be defined as those goods, material or immaterial, 
including knowledge, feedback and tips, given to an alter in the expectation that it will be accepted 
and reciprocated at some point. Gift exchange needs to be out-of-balance at any moment in time so 
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that it is clear that a relation will continue in the future. Because gift exchange is unbalanced when 
viewed at one point in time, a longitudinal perspective reveals the nature of gift giving: a gift is not 
reciprocated by an immediate return or compensation (Bourdieu 1977; Deckop et al. 2003; Ferrary 
2003; Mauss 1954). A deferred return-gift obligates one individual to another, creating social debt. 
Reciprocity is open to discretion as to the value and form of the counter-gift; the nature of the 
compensation is not specified beforehand and highly context-dependent (Bourdieu 1977; Deckop et 
al. 2003; Gouldner 1960; Mauss 1954; Zaidman & Brock 2009). Specifying obligations a priori 
may prompt an abrupt end to the relation, yet not giving any specifications at all about the nature of 
the exchange may allow for misinterpretation or abuse of the situation. Gift exchange is carried out 
without a legal contract (Ferrary 2003), but even so it creates an informal obligation (Gouldner 
1960; Levi-Strauss 1996; Malinowski 1996; Mauss 1954; Sahlins 1996; Schwartz 1996; Simmel 
1996). Gift giving confers benefits of an economic and a social nature simultaneously (Belk 1979; 
Larsen & Watson 2001). Gift exchange is, however, not only an economic transaction providing 
economic (material) benefit, it is also a good in itself, a ‘process benefit’, in the sense of sustaining 
personal relationships (Avner 1997). Relations between giver and receiver may become 
increasingly personal and are an important dimension of many transactions. They then come to 
have a value independent of their instrumental functions in regulating transactions (Rose-Ackerman 
1998). The notion of gift exchange thus explains how relations are established, maintained, or may 
discontinue (Belk 1979; Cheal 1988; Gouldner 1960; Larsen & Watson 2001; Mauss 1954; 
McGrath & Englis 1996; Ruth et al. 1999; Sherry 1983).  
 As a corollary of the cycle of giving, receiving and reciprocating, obligations, as well as 
trust and gratitude are generated between the (exchange) parties involved (Belk & Coon 1993 Blau 
1964; Euhara 1990; Gouldner 1960; Sahlins 1996; Mauss 1954).  Gift exchange is associated with 
the generation of positive emotions and uncertainty reduction which generates cohesion and 
commitment (Homans 1958; Ingram and Robert, 2000; Lawler et al. 2000). Frequent gift or favor 
exchange is associated with the creation of trust facilitating further cooperation (Coleman 1988; 
 15 
 
15 
Fukuyama 1995; Nooteboom 2002; Putnam 1993),  and establishes a common frame of reference, 
lowering associated risk and uncertainty between parties, and establishing partners’ trustworthiness 
(McAllister 1995; Shapiro 1987; Smith Ring & van de Ven, 1992). This process allows Ego to 
make inferences about both competence and intentional trust in Alter (Nooteboom 2002). What 
may have started out as a mostly goal oriented interaction may become embedded over time in 
social relations (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997), in part because individuals strive to derive a sense 
of pleasure or intrinsic satisfaction from their interactions (du Gay 1996; Eccles 1981).  
“Gifts can be described as an investment in the relationship between donor and recipient. 
The greater the value of the gift, the more substantial the investment” (Larsen & Watson; 2001). 
These investments are not only necessary since connections are not givens but require work 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1986), but also expedient since they can purposively yet carefully be used to (try 
to) create social obligations (Bourdieu 1977; Burt 1992; Coleman 1988, 1994; Darr 2003; 
Granovetter 1985; Kotter 1985; Mauss 1954; Walton and Mckersie 1969; Yukl and Falbe 1991). By 
the same token, if alters are indebted to ego, he can use this as a basis for entitlement to future 
support (Coleman 1988, 1994; Mauss 1954). Given that these obligations are social, non-
contractual and legally unenforceable, actors cannot draw on them at will, however. Failing to 
reciprocate, nonetheless, will effectively prevent ongoing profitable exchanges but can also mean 
excommunication from the relevant group (Barney & Hansen 1994 from Rose-Ackerman 1998; 
Ferrary 2003; Van der Eijk et al. 2009; Williamson 1975).  
The literature on gift exchange is rightly placed in the broader context of social exchange 
theory (Ekeh 1974), and so the explanation we offer for knowledge transfer in an open innovation 
context complements, we believe, the analyses of OI offered by others (von Hippel 1987; Lakhani 
& von Hippel 2003). As gift exchange not only transfer utility but also is socially meaningful 
interaction embedded in relations of mutual dependence and obligation, it contributes to the 
willingness to transfer knowledge (Camerer 1988; Cheal 1986). Especially when exchange involves 
uncertainties and interdependencies that can by definition not be fully foreseen and contracted for 
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will social coordination through gift exchange be the coordination mechanism of choice. This is 
evident from the discussion of corporate scientists sharing knowledge: as knowledge develops 
cumulatively in the context of a community of practice, understanding what drives knowledge 
sharing is of some import. 
 
5. Knowledge Sharing, Gifts, and Engineers  
Considering the uncertainty and social dimensions related to knowledge development, market 
contracts or direction in a hierarchy may not, in all cases, lead to the desired result of knowledge 
exchange. Knowledge sharing can be largely extra-role or discretionary. In the context of the 
development of open source software, this already is readily acknowledged (Henkel 2006; von 
Hippel 1987; Lakhani & von Hippel 2003). In this section we show how the mechanisms of gift 
exchange we have elaborated upon above play a role in knowledge sharing (Darr 2003; Sjostrand 
2004). Gift exchange, not necessarily fully voluntary but nevertheless extra-role in many instances 
is driven by obligations of a social and informal nature, as argued. Gift exchange, involving 
altruistic as well as more self-interested motives, provides the parties involved with a mechanism 
for the exchange of resources as well as with incentives to do so especially in the kind of 
circumstances where both interdependencies and uncertainty are substantial as is the case for 
knowledge development. Social obligations stemming from gift exchange and the network position 
taken can be employed to elicit future support (Coleman 1988) for instance to obtain the further 
knowledge that is needed (Bouty 2000; Darr 2003; Ensign 2009; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones 1992). 
Reciprocal gift exchange establishes a transactional relationship between individuals (Sherry 1983) 
and allows actors to forge and personalize relationships and to develop guarantees of personal 
bonding (Shapiro 1987; Zucker 1986). As these relationships develop and the exchange interactions 
progresses actors learn to cooperate with these particular others (Gulati 1995; Powell et al. 1996; 
Starpoli 1998) and establish a common frame of reference allowing actors to incorporate new, 
possibly complex and tacit knowledge (Hansen 1999; Kogut and Zander 1992; Von Hippel 1994). 
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As actors thus bridge ‘cognitive distance’ (Nooteboom 2002) “tacit or personal knowledge which is 
anchored on the commitment of and beliefs of its holder” (Nonaka 1994) can be interpreted and 
acted upon.  
In studies looking at what determines the success that some corporate laboratory scientists 
have and others lack some noteworthy findings emerge. Those who actively engage in the 
publication of papers, giving to the scientific community at large, are more successful at developing 
knowledge than those who don’t (Bouty 2000). This is, obviously, partly due to the fact that this is 
a means for them to be up-to-speed with the most recent developments in their fields, keeping their 
own and their organization’s absorptive capacity high (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). There is more to 
this, however. These scientists claim themselves that they also receive more from others, working 
elsewhere, formally and informally, in the form of access to scientists in other organizations and 
unpublished or tacit knowledge (Furukawa & Goto 2006; Hicks 1995). Most of the knowledge at 
the frontier of advanced research may be tacit (Hicks 1995); such knowledge will only be shared 
with researchers whom one has established a longer term relationship of trust and understanding 
with, a relationship of strong ties (Hansen 1999). Corporate scientists, creating goodwill and 
establishing obligations ‘by building a relationship of give and take with the scientific community’ 
(Hicks 1995), can act as technological gatekeepers and serve as a bridge between external sources 
of knowledge and their co-workers. This active behavior in publishing of some scientists in an 
organization boosts their effectiveness within their own organizations as well. The resulting flow of 
knowledge encourages innovation in which they themselves and their co-workers are involved, 
thereby benefiting the organization as whole (Furukawa & Goto 2006).  
 The story of corporate scientists cooperating informally through gift exchange continues. 
Bouty (2000) has shown that lab scientists can be involved in relations with scientists they know in 
other, sometimes competing, organizations, helping each other out in ways that may sometimes 
counter explicit organizational regulations, and if abused by alters could seriously hurt ego’s 
organization. Still, with specific others, laboratory tests, feedback, hints and the like are exchanged. 
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Gifts are offered, received and reciprocated. The element of limited circulation of gifts in a trusted 
circle of peers is clear: if a person is not known, no gifts are exchanged; if a person is not known 
well, gifts of low value such as commonly available knowledge is exchanged; if a person is known 
well and for a long time very valuable and highly sensitive knowledge can get to be exchanged. 
Indeed, contrary to expectations from economic theory, opportunities to exchange are not seized if 
ego knows that alter could just as well engage with others (Ensign 2009, p.106). Also, rare and 
valuable knowledge is more likely to be shared than common and easily obtainable knowledge 
provided that “assurances that [return gifts] will follow” are there (ibid.). Such assurances are not 
contractually enforced or mandated, and so failure to reciprocate will hurt ego. Exchange 
opportunities are preferably entered into that give rise to more substantial returns some unspecified 
time in the future. In each of these cases, of course, no formal guarantee of a counter-gift, of equal 
value, is available. Opportunism remains possible at all times, but would lead to excommunication 
and a loss of reputation. In gift exchange actors do evaluate the value of knowledge exchanged, 
especially in case of enhanced uncertainties and (strategic) interdependencies involved when 
crossing organizational boundaries (Bouty 2000; von Hippel 1987; Kreiner & Schultz 1993). These 
relations between corporate scientists within and between firms involved in exchanging knowledge 
is not an uncommon phenomenon (see Allen 1977; Kreiner & Schultz 1993; Von Hippel 1987; 
Brown & Duguid 1991, 2001;Wenger & Snyder 2000; Wenger 2001), but has not been provided 
with proper behavioral micro foundations. Although we argue that such micro foundations are to be 
found in the gift exchange literature, we do acknowledge that the social coordination of knowledge 
sharing dynamics through gift exchange offers challenges for managers. 
 
6. Challenges for Management of Coordination through Gift Exchange 
While exchange of gift provides a stimulus for the flow of knowledge, attempting to purposefully 
coordinate this by providing directed incentives for knowledge sharing does present specific 
challenges for management. Firstly, gift exchange for the most part takes place between concrete 
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individuals, who may establish idiosyncratic rituals and expectations. It may be hard to formulate 
formal policy to stimulate this kind of activity. Secondly, for gift exchange to personalize, relations 
that may guarantee reciprocation need to develop over an extended period of time. One also is only 
able to initiate and maintain so many relationships in a given period of time (Lesser 2000), and 
developing each relation to the necessary level of trust takes time too. Thirdly, social obligations 
established through gift exchange cannot usually be enforced and so actors are most likely to 
coordinate knowledge exchange via gift exchange when other options are not sufficient, too 
inflexible, too time-consuming or otherwise impractical (Ferrary 2003; Smart 1993). Knowledge 
transfer through gift exchange is to some extent vulnerable from abuse. Fourthly, gift exchange 
effectiveness in part depends on the extent to which the incentive structure of an organization can 
be altered in such a way that honoring social debts and cooperation becomes an effective course of 
action for the individual. The effectiveness of social enforcement mechanisms can be impaired if 
the likelihood or benefit of continued informal cooperation is small (Kreps 1990), or if the network 
structure is such that subsequent action cannot be monitored or communicated thus limiting the 
effectiveness of reputations (Coleman 1988; Hill 1990; Lazaric & Lorenz 1998). Fifthly, gift 
exchange obviously has no bearing on situations were knowledge is intentionally sought and non-
voluntary or unknowingly obtained. Knowledge acquisition by means of hacking, reverse 
engineering, industrial espionage or “outlaw innovation” (Flowers 2008) clearly do not fit the gift 
exchange model. Finally, while organizations generally strive to maximize knowledge flows within 
organizational boundaries or into the organization, they are likely to try to minimize knowledge 
flows across organizational boundaries. While spillover effects are pervasive (Audretsch & 
Feldman 1996; Feldman 1999; de Laat 1999; Owen-Smith & Powell 2004), they are not only 
associated with formal cooperative arrangements between firms but also with informal personalized 
exchange between knowledge workers (e.g. Allen 1977; Agrawal et al. 2003; Kreiner & Schultz 
1993; Von Hippel 1987). While, it is evident that companies need to preserve core competencies 
(cf. Henkel 2006), there is a danger that organizations attach to much weight to appropriability 
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considerations, neglecting the dynamic of new knowledge creation and knowledge flows between 
firms and other social entities that they may also benefit from in the end (Chesborough 2003a, b; 
Nooteboom 2002; Saxenian 1994; von Hippel 1987). As a result of too strict a policy of spill-over 
control the firm might hamper the innovation development process (Soh 2010). Those actors that do 
not give do not receive in return either.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Innovativeness of individuals and firms is largely dependent on people within and beyond the firm 
exchanging knowledge and information. Social Network Analysis (SNA) allows an analysis of the 
structure of interactions within a firm: how do interactions affect behavior of actors within a firm 
and ultimately firm performance? Given the nature of knowledge and its development, discussed in 
Section 2 above, however, the issue of why actors would actually use their relations for these 
purposes remains a mystery for SNA. SNA has an ‘action problem’ as it does not allow for agency. 
The need for behavioral micro foundations for knowledge exchange is especially needed in the 
context of Open Innovation. 
 The notion of gift exchange allows one to explain why persons exchange knowledge with 
each other even if they are not obliged to by contract or instruction. Gifts can be non-material to 
include knowledge and are exchanged for multiple reasons, but especially provide a means of 
control in case of interdependencies and uncertainties. The literature of gift exchange explains how 
mutual trust and informal obligations between persons emerge, and allows one to understand how 
relations start, work and come to an end. We have argued how gift exchange offers a powerful and 
necessary complement to the insights that Social Network Analysis offers. Especially for OI, 
research has shown how researchers involved in gift exchange are more successful as researchers. 
Thus we offer a perspective for the discussion on ‘open innovation’ that complements the more 
strategic discussions by offering behavioral micro foundations for the processes of socially sharing 
knowledge within and between organizations.  
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